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Abstract 
 
Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building: 
The Hutubi Rural Social Security Loan Program in China*
                                                 
* This study is the first part of a multi-method inquiry into the Hutubi Community social security policy 
innovation being conducted in a research partnership between the Center for Social Development (CSD) of 
Washington University in St. Louis and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The authors 
express our gratitude to Yang Tuan and Zhang ShiFei of CASS. Li Zou of CSD facilitated field work for 
this study. The entire research team is indebted to Guo Xincai and his staff at the Hutubi social security 
office for their exceptional hospitality, openness, and assistance in data collection. Finally, this study is 
made possible through funding from the Levi-Strauss Foundation; the authors thank Sharon Tan and Daniel 
Lee for their support. 
 
 
 
The Hutubi Rural Social Security Loan program is a policy innovation in a rural area of 
China by loaning savings in social security accounts back to peasants for them to 
purchase assets for agricultural and other development. In contrast to the nationwide 
recession in rural social security, this program has shown its success in proliferating rural 
social security funds and retaining social security participants. With a focus on the 
administrative data of the loan program, this study aims to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the loan program and examine how asset building is possible for the 
poor when institutional incentives are offered. The findings show that when proper policy 
incentives are provided, poor peasants can build assets. The Hutubi program may be a 
good model for other rural areas in China and other developing countries. 
 
Keywords: Asset building, Social security, Rural China, Microcredit, Savings, 
Institutional incentives
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Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building: 
The Hutubi Rural Social Security Loan Program in China 
 
 
Asset-based policy has received increasing attention worldwide as a promising 
direction for domestic policy development. Supplementing traditional income-support 
social programs, asset-based policy promotes household saving and asset accumulation. 
For example, in the United States, employer-sponsored retirement plans (such as 401k 
and 403b) and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) have been in practice to promote 
security after retirement; and the Individual Development Account (IDA) program has 
been implemented in more than 40 states to encourage low-income families to build 
assets (Warren & Edwards, 2006). In the United Kingdom, the universal Child Trust 
Fund, a savings and investment account for children, was initiated in 2005 (Loke & 
Sherraden, 2006). In Singapore, the Central Provident Fund, a comprehensive social 
security savings plan has become increasingly successful over several generations (Loke 
& Sherraden, 2006). In addition, asset building demonstration projects have spread to 
other countries, including Australia, Canada, Peru, and Uganda. 
    Despite similar goals of these programs—to encourage saving and asset accumulation, 
the incentives and institutional structure may vary in different social contexts. For 
instance, with an average match rate of about 2:1, participants of the IDAs program in the 
US accumulated approximately $700 per year in IDAs for purposes such as buying a first 
home, education, or a small business (Schreiner, Clancy & Sherraden, 2002). The Child 
Trust Fund in the UK allows children born on or after September 1, 2002 to receive a 
£250 voucher from the government to start an account, with an additional £250 for low-
income families (U.K. Parliament, 2004). In addition to matching deposits and 
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government seed funds, institutional incentives can also include, but are not limited to: 
direct deposit, tax-free earnings, and achievable savings goals. As suggested by Beverly 
and Sherraden (1999), institutional factors of asset-based programs, including access, 
information, incentives, facilitation, expectations, restrictions, and security, may 
contribute to the success of the aforementioned policies. Empirical evidence from IDA 
programs supports this perspective (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). 
To include low-income populations in asset building, it may be especially important 
to provide incentives because poor people tend to take current needs as a priority, and in 
the short run, saving has less marginal effect on their well-being. Inclusion of the poor in 
asset accumulation is a major challenge for the development of asset-based policy. This 
case study will explore how institutional mechanisms are built into the Hutubi Rural 
Social Security loan program, a local policy initiative in northwest China, and how the 
program has successfully promoted asset building in rural areas. 
Hutubi is a remote county located 70 kilometers west of Urumqi in the Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region of northwest China. The county has 24 ethnic groups with a 
total population of 207,200, among which 31,000 live in rural areas. Most rural 
households in this county engage in farming and livestock raising. In 2004, the county’s 
per capita annual net income for rural households was ¥5,510 (approximately US$689), 
significantly lower than its urban counterparts, ¥9,422 at the national level and ¥7,503 at 
the provincial level (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004).  
As part of Hutubi rural social security, which is based on saving by the household, 
the loan program allows peasants to mortgage their social security savings to obtain loans 
for the purposes of purchasing livestock and farming tools. Compared with saving solely 
for old age, the loan program provides additional incentives for peasants to invest in 
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productive assets, such as tools, equipment, and livestock (Siegel & Alwang, 1999). 
Through analysis of administrative data, this study explores how the loan mechanism was 
developed and its consequences for Hutubi rural social security and peasants. 
Background 
Rural Social Security in China 
Peasants in Hutubi County, like those in other areas of rural China, did not have any 
form of social security program until 1992 (Béland & Yu, 2004; China Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 1992). Different from the traditional pay-as-you-go social security system in 
most welfare states, China’s rural social security is an asset-building program relying 
mainly on personal savings in individual social security accounts. The China Rural Social 
Security Scheme of 1992 allows peasants between 20 and 60 years of age to participate in 
rural social security by contributing a portion of their (after-tax) income to individual 
old-age accounts. Participation in rural social security is voluntary and individuals can 
withdraw at any time. Rural social security funds are raised mainly by individual 
contributions and supplemented by collective contributions if possible. Collective 
contributions are made by villages or rural enterprises, depending on the local economic 
situation, as matching funds for individual accounts. Collective entities (e.g., villages and 
rural enterprises) that make contributions receive tax credit. This policy is managed at the 
county level by the local rural social security office. Rural social security funds cannot be 
used for direct investment (e.g., investment in real estate or the stock market) (China 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1992). In most cases, the funds can only be saved in a bank 
account. Individuals are allowed to withdraw funds from their accounts when they reach 
60 years of age or encounter emergencies, such as natural disasters.  
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Thus, rural social security aims to provide economic security to elderly people in 
rural areas. However, this policy has had shortcomings from its inception. First, 
individual contributions are too low to ensure economic security in old age. The 
individual contribution is set at an extremely low level of between ¥2-20 (US$0.25-2.5) 
per month (China Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1992). At this level, peasants can hardly 
accumulate even a minimal level of financial resources to meet economic needs in later 
life. For example, a 50-year-old individual who started contributing the maximum of ¥20 
per month in 1994 would receive ¥50 per month beginning in 2004 (given the fixed bank 
savings interest rate1. That would be an annual social security income of ¥600, roughly 
equal to the 2004 rural poverty line (¥627) (Peng & Song, 2002). The benefit of rural 
social security is woefully low. Although the county government can adjust individual 
contributions depending on the local economic situation, the individual contributions set 
by the program cannot create much security for rural populations. 
Second, structural incentives for asset accumulation do not seem to be very 
effective. Collective contributions to match savings is the major incentive provided by 
this policy. However, in reality the majority of program participants do not receive 
matching funds from collective entities (Wang & Zhang, 2006; Xu, 2006). This occurs 
only in rich rural communities on the south-east coast. In other words, the so-called 
matched collective contribution has no significant effect on rural social security 
participation in Hutubi County.  
Third, rural social security funds are constrained from investment. Rural social 
security funds cannot be used for any form of direct investment. The only legitimate 
                                                 
1 The individual contribution rate has increased substantially in few areas where rural social security has 
resumed since 2005. The new rate varies across the country. 
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ways to keep funds from depreciation in value are (1) to save as bank savings or (2) to 
purchase low-risk bonds or securities issued by the central government. The rapid 
economic growth in China in the last decade, however, has been accompanied by bank 
savings interest rates decreasing over time while the inflation rate has been increasing 
since 1996, which makes rural security funds vulnerable to depreciation (Peng & Song, 
2002). In many places, interests earned by rural social security funds are not even 
sufficient to cover managerial expenses of the program.  
Thus, institutional incentives provided by rural social security are quite weak, and 
this has limited its effectiveness in encouraging peasants to save for their old-age 
security. Eventually, a peasant’s commitment to rural social security depends on his/her 
concern about economic prospects and desire to balance current consumption and saving 
for later life. In the short history of rural social security, the absence of effective 
incentives has regretfully led to the sharp decline in the number of participants, dropping 
from over 80 million in 1998 to 54 million in 2003 (State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 2004; Peng & Song, 2002). Afflicted by many challenges in 
management, most rural areas, including Hutubi County, stopped recruiting new 
participants into the rural social security program in 1999.  
Rural Social Security Loan Program in Hutubi 
The Hutubi rural social security loan program was initiated in 1998 by a local rural 
social security office, with the goal of addressing some of the above institutional flaws. 
In cooperation with local bank, the rural social security agency allows participants to use 
their own or others’ social security savings as legal collateral to borrow loans up to 50% 
of their individual social security savings to purchase physical assets related to 
agricultural production, such as livestock, seeds, and agricultural tools, or other 
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productive uses (Hutubi County Bureau of Civil Affairs, 2005). This innovative loan 
program, on the one hand, expands the investment options of the rural social security 
fund and increases interest gains of the social security fund from mortgage loans; on the 
other hand, it creates an additional incentive—access to mortgage loans, and an 
additional goal for peasants—investments in agricultural assets or other investments such 
as children’s education or building a house. The creator of the Hutubi program, Mr. Guo 
Xincai, has referred to this as taking “dead assets” and making them “alive.” 
Compared to the conventional access to loans by using land or a house as collateral 
or by applying for a group loan with at least four other families joining together, the 
innovative Hutubi loan program provides unique intuitional benefits for peasants to 
access and obtain small loans (Zhang, 2006). In most rural areas of China, peasants’ 
needs for microcredit are barely met due to lack of well-established financial services. 
Hence, this new form of loan has been acclaimed by Hutubi peasants because it meets 
their financial needs.  
To sum up, the loan program, which is based on the existing social security policy, 
has created a scenario with dual incentives and dual asset building (Figure 1): secure 
savings and matching contributions provide primary incentives for peasants to build 
assets for old age, and the availability of loans has created a secondary incentive, 
allowing peasants to borrow for agricultural and other development, which can lead to 
further asset building. 
 This study provides a closer examination of the administrative data of the Hutubi 
rural social security loan program through descriptive statistics on the loans and then a 
focus on the success of the policy innovation. 
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Data 
The Hutubi rural social security loan program administrative data were obtained by 
a research team from Washington University’s Center for Social Development in the 
summer of 2006. The data provide detailed information about each loan since 1998, 
including the borrower’s demographics, the loan amount, the interest rate, and the 
expected and actual loan term.  
The data cover 1,286 cases of mortgage loans between 1998 and 2006. In this 
program, mortgage loan refers to the money borrowed by a rural social security 
participant, with the social security savings being mortgaged. Each loan does not exceed 
50% of the total balance (the rate was increased to 70% in 2005). The borrower may also 
use social security savings of their relatives, neighbors, or friends for the purpose of a 
mortgage loan. In reviewing the data, we decided to exclude 23 mortgage loan cases, in 
which the borrower is not an individual but an agency or a company. Consequently, the 
analysis uses a final sample of 1,263.  
Program Statistics 
Demographic Characteristics 
Most of the borrowers are male (n=1,080, 85.62%); only 14.4% (n=181) are female 
(Table 1). This can possibly be explained by the fact that most households in China are 
headed by males. Ethnicity breakdown shows that over 90% of borrowers are Han and 
less than 8% are from the three major minority groups in the local area: Hui (3.6%), Wei 
Wu Er (1.8%), and Ha Sa Ke (2.2%). The percentage of minority participants is lower 
than the overall share of ethnic minority populations in the Hutubi County (22.4%) 
(Xinjiang Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Borrowers are from the four sub-counties (Zhen) of 
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the Hutubi County—Da Feng Zhen, Yuan Hu Cun Zhen, Wu Gong Tai Zhen, and Er Shi 
Li Dian Zhen.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The distribution of borrowers’ current age (as of 2006) is as follows: 4.6% (n=57) of 
borrowers are between 20 and 29 years old; 29.7% (n=367) are between 30 and 39; 
respondents between 40 and 49 have the highest percentage (n=451, 36.5%); less than 
10% of borrowers (n=87, 7%) of are 60 years and above. This age distribution is slightly 
different from that at which the loan was borrowed. Two borrowers were below 20 years 
old when they took the loan. Twelve percent of borrowers (n=148) received the loan 
when their ages were between 20 and 29. This percentage is much higher than that in the 
current age distribution.  
Loan Information 
Loan amount. The average amount of loan is ¥6,072 (SD=¥5,993), and the median is 
¥4,500 (Table 2). Given the county’s per capita annual net income of rural Households of 
¥5,510 in 2004, with the loan program, borrowers may receive a loan with the amount 
almost equivalent to their annual per capita net income.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Interest rate. A loan’s interest rate is the same as a bank loan interest rate. Between 
1998 and 2006, the interest rate for mortgage loan ranged between 0.53% and 0.81%. 
About 46% (575) of cases have the interest rate of 0.70%. The amount of interest2 paid 
ranges from ¥9 to ¥5,974.  
 The ratio between the amount of interest paid and the amount of loan suggests 
cost-benefit analysis for borrowers. The average of this ratio turns out to be 0.116 
Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
9
(SD=0.088) and the median is 0.093, which indicate that a typical borrower has to pay 
about 10% of the loan as interest.  
 Clearance. The average expected loan term is 639 days (SD =459), longer than 
the average of the actual loan term (484 days), the number of days between the date of 
receiving the loan and the date of returning the all the loan plus the interest. In other 
words, most of loans were returned prior to expected returned dates. As of July 31, 2006, 
972 mortgage loan cases (77%) had been returned. If we exclude mortgage loan cases in 
20063, the return rate is much higher (96%). Among the returned cases, nearly 71% were 
returned prior to the expected return date indicated on the loan contract. It took 279 
borrowers (29%) a longer than expected term to return loans, at the cost of paying more 
interest at a higher (punitive) interest rate.  
 Social security accounts. On average, each loan has 5.47 social security savings 
accounts involved as mortgages. This suggests that most borrowers used social security 
savings other than their own. It is perhaps not surprising that the number of social 
security savings accounts and the amount of loan are highly correlated (r=0.71, p<0.001). 
More information will be available as we divide the amount of the loan by the number of 
savings accounts. The mean of this new variable is ¥1,281 (SD=¥1,081), and the median 
is ¥1,077, which indicates on average how much a borrower can borrow from each 
mortgaged social security savings account.  
Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building: A Closer Look 
 The administrative data, combined with some other information, allows us to 
closely see the successful outcomes of the dual incentive and dual asset building 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 The amount of interest is calculated by loan amount * interest rate/30 * number of days. 
3 The reasons to exclude mortgage loan cases in 2006 is that most loans will not be returned until the fall 
(after harvests). 
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structure. We will examine trends in the social security funds, number of participants, 
savings in the individual account, loan for assets leading to production, and number of 
loans processed over the years. 
Social Security Fund Increased 
While rural social security has been in recession nationwide during the past eight 
years, the Hutubi Rural Social Security Fund has grown at a rate of 7% each year, from 
¥12 million (about US$1.5 million) in early 1998 into ¥24 million (about US$3 million) 
by the end of 2005, “outperforming the meager bank interest rate of 2.25%” (Bai, 2005). 
By 2005, the fund has already doubled through compound interest (Bai, 2005). As shown 
in Table 3, during the three years of suspension of the loan program (1999-2001), the 
increase rate of the rural social security fund was less than during the other years. In 
other words, the loan program successfully generated interest gains that increase social 
security funds against inflation and contribute to long-term stability. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Retention of Participants 
 As mentioned above, between 1998 and 2003, the rural social security roll in the 
nation dropped from 80 million to 54 million (CASS, 2000; Tang, 2001). In 1997, a year 
before the loan program was initiated in Hutubi, the total number of participants in rural 
social security decreased by nearly 15% from over 10,000 to about 8,600. In the 
subsequent eight years, however, the number of participants remained steady at 8,600. 
This may indicate that creation of the loan program has become an effective way to retain 
participants4.  
                                                 
4 Because of the suspension of the program, the total number of participants did not increase until 2005. 
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Savings in Individual Social Security Accounts Increased 
While this information is not directly available from the administrative data, the 
increase in individual social security savings accounts may be reflected in the loan 
information. Essentially, the total amount of loan available to a borrower depends on the 
number of social security accounts mortgaged and the amount of saving in each account. 
In other words, the ratio between the amount of loan and the number of mortgaged 
accounts by year can provide an estimation of savings in a typical individual account. 
The data (Figure 2) show that this ratio increases from ¥623 in 1998, to ¥974 in 2002, to 
¥1,530 in 2003, and to ¥1,561 in 2004, indicating that the average amount of savings in 
individual accounts is increasing over the years. By this measure, savings in a typical 
account in 2004 is nearly 2.5 times that in 1998.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Peasants’ Physical Assets Increased 
Peasants take out loans mainly for purchasing physical assets related to 
agricultural/pastoral production (97.7%). A majority (56.8%) of peasants used the loan to 
purchase livestock (cows and sheep); other investments include seeds (38.4%), electrical 
farming equipments (1%), small business (0.9%), and transportation tools (0.6%) (Zhang, 
2006). When loans are used for agricultural and/or pastoral production, it can be expected 
that household assets will increase. For example, a peasant who borrows ¥16,000 to 
purchase two cows can expect to have a monthly income of ¥1,000 or even more. 
As mortgage loans are mostly used for agricultural/pastoral purposes, the data show 
a strong seasonal pattern in the loan start and return dates each year. Generally speaking, 
the loan start dates concentrate in the planting season (March, April, May) while the loan 
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return dates concentrate in the harvest season (September, October, November) (Figures 
3 & 4). 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
Number of Loans Increased 
As shown in Table 4, the number of mortgage loans varies across years. Over 50% 
of mortgage loans (n=656) were issued in 2002 and about 20% (n=258) in 2006. No 
information is available for 1999, 2000, and 2001 because the mortgage loan program 
was suspended in these years due to procedural controversies between government 
entities in the local area. Fewer than 100 mortgage loans were taken in 1998 and 2004. 
With the procedural and policy issues resolved, 2002 witnessed a significant increase in 
the total amounts of loans, loan interest, and number of social security accounts, 
exceeding all the other years (see Table 5).  
[Insert Tables 4 & 5 about here] 
Discussion 
The Hutubi rural social security loan practice by the local government has drawn 
considerable interest from policy makers. Authorized by China Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security, Hutubi resumed its rural social security program in 2005 by recruiting 
new participants. In the meantime, it has become exemplary for other underdeveloped 
rural areas in developing social security. In carefully reflecting on the Hutubi practice, 
implications and limitations can be identified.  
Policy Implications      
 Microcredit scheme in poor rural areas. In many developing countries, the lack 
of well-established financial services and microcredit has limited peasants’ access to 
loans for poverty alleviation. The Hutubi rural social security loan program suggests that 
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access to loans, mortgaging social security accounts, loaning, using the capital for 
production investments, and paying back loans can provide a practical avenue for 
peasants to improve their circumstances and also build credit. This gives peasants the 
possibility to access other financial services. 
The poor and financial skills. Evidence indicates a positive relationship between 
financial skills and asset building (Zhan & Schreiner, 2005). For most rural populations, 
limited financial opportunities in rural areas may have formed insurmountable 
institutional barriers for the poor to build financial skills. The loan program, although not 
intended as formal financial education, can help individuals through loaning practice to 
improve financial skills and better understand the financial system. 
 Effects of assets on risk taking. In most cases, investment in physical assets for 
production can lead to better economic well-being, though investment is simultaneously a 
risk to some extent. With the loan program, peasants obtain loans for agricultural or 
pastoral investment. Savings together with loans provide a foundation for risk taking, 
which can move peasants toward greater economic benefits.  
Social network. The importance of social networks is implicitly reflected in the loan 
program in that it allows peasants to use social security accounts of family members, 
relatives, and friends for loans. Social networks expand an individual’s access to 
financial resources on the one hand, and on the other hand pose social pressure on this 
individual to make proper use of the loan and return the loan to restore the social security 
account. Unfortunately, the current data do not have information that would illuminate 
credit development, financial self-education, and the role of social networks. 
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Limitations 
Despite the apparent successes of the Hutubi rural social security loan program, its 
limitations should also be noted. 
Potential risk. The current loan program has a high pay-back rate (96%) for several 
reasons. (1) The use of loan is strictly defined. In most cases, it has to be invested in 
physical assets for production. (2) Availability of loans is primarily based on an 
individual’s social network, which imposes pressure for paying off the loan. (3) Peasants 
are well aware of the consequence of not repaying the loan—losing social security 
benefits in later life. Although the loan program is a low-risk policy for local 
administration, it could mean a high risk for individuals in a particular loan case. As far 
as individuals are concerned, those who borrow would lose social security benefits if they 
fail to repay the loans. In this regard, the loan program has elements conflicting with 
social security itself. Of course, if the loan program generates greater wealth among 
farmers, this implies security in old age. 
Loan as incentive. In the Hutubi program, the loan has indeed become an effective 
incentive for peasants to join in rural social security and to build household assets. Note 
that all of this occurs where the rural financial system is underdeveloped, with existing 
financial services minimally accessible to most peasants. If this situation were changed 
with improvements in the financial system, the loan program as an incentive for asset 
building might be weakened to some degree. 
Equity issue. In some countries, government seed funds and matching funds are 
made available to low-income participants in asset-building programs, such as the IDA 
program in the US and the Child Trust Fund in the UK. Compared with those policy 
features, the Hutubi loan program lacks a consideration of equity, because availability of 
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loans depends on an individual’s own saving and/or social network. In other words, 
people who are extremely poor or have no social network are less likely to benefit from 
the loan program.  
Conclusion 
The Hutubi rural social security loan program is apparently successful in developing 
policy incentives to encourage asset building in a rural area of China. Incentives tailored 
to local situations can serve the local people very well. Structural incentives, when 
appropriately designed and practically implemented, can encourage the poor to build 
assets. In the rural context of Hutubi, matching funds are not feasible because of the 
limited financial capacity of the local government; tax benefits are not feasible either 
because this is not compatible with the existing tax system. But, access to small loans and 
rudimentary financial services fit peasants’ financial needs. Like Hutubi, most rural areas 
of the developing world have limited financial services for peasants. The Hutubi loan 
program shows that asset building is possible when proper financial services are offered. 
This may be a good model for other rural areas in China and other developing countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of borrowers 
Variable Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender   (n=1,261) 
    Male 
    Female 
 
1080 
181 
 
85.7 
14.3 
Ethnicity  (n=1,263) 
    Han 
    Hui 
    Wei Wu Er 
    Ha Sa Ke 
    Others  
 
1162 
45 
23 
28 
5 
 
92.0 
3.6 
1.8 
2.2 
0.4 
Age as of 2006  (n=1,237) 
    20-29 
    30-39 
    40-49 
    50-59 
    >59 
 
57 
367 
451 
275 
87 
 
4.6 
29.7 
36.5 
22.2 
7.0 
Age at which loan was borrowed (n=1,237) 
    <20 
    20-29 
    30-39 
    40-49 
    50-59 
    >59 
 
2 
148 
389 
439 
213 
46 
 
0.2 
12.0 
31.5 
35.5 
17.2 
3.7 
Sub-County  
    Da Feng Zhen 
    Yuan Hu Cun Zhen 
    Wu Gong Tai Zhen 
    Er Shi Li Dian Zhen 
 
341 
145 
359 
425 
 
27.0 
11.5 
27.6 
33.7 
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Table 2: Loan information 
Variable N Mean (SD) Median Freq. % 
Amount of loan (¥)   1,263 6,072.34 (5992.61) 4,500   
Amount of loan by year (¥)   
   1998 
   2002 
   2003 
   2004 
   2005 
   2006 
1,262  
7,870.83 
5,561.13 
7,772.83 
5,890.59 
6,895.65 
6,187.60 
 
(7,790.88) 
(4,919.70) 
(1,1248.95
) 
(3,968.92) 
(7,962.17) 
(4,564.99) 
 
5,000 
4,000 
4,150 
5,000 
4,000 
4,550 
  
Interest rate (%) 1,263 0.71403 (.46870) 0.6975   
Expected loan term (days)   1,263 639 (459) 243   
Actual loan term (days)   955 484 (326) 326   
Loan return status   
  Returned 
  Not returned yet 
Loan return status for 2006 cases 
  Returned 
  Not returned yet 
Loan return status for cases in all 
years*  
  Returned 
  Not returned yet 
1,263  
 
   
972 
291 
 
4 
254 
 
968 
37 
 
76.96 
23.04 
 
1.55 
98.45 
 
96.32 
3.68 
When was the loan returned?        
  On time 
  Early return 
  Delayed return 
956     
13 
664 
279 
 
1.36 
69.46 
29.18 
Amount of interest (¥) 959 698.86 (842.82) 406.22   
Interest/amount ratio     952 0.116 (0.088) 0.093   
Interest/amount ratio by return status   
  On time 
  Early return 
  Delayed return 
954  
0.045 
0.129 
0.113 
 
(0.005) 
(0.115) 
(0.169) 
 
0.046 
0.126 
0.054 
  
Number of social security cards per 
loan 
1,194 5.43 (4.70) 4.00   
Amount per social security card per 
loan  
1,194 1,218.51 (1,081.32) 1,077.50   
  * Excluding 2006. 
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Table 3: Hutubi rural social security fund by year 
Year* Total amount  
(in thousands ¥) 
Annual interest 
(in thousands ¥) 
Increase rate  
(%) 
1998 
1999** 
2000** 
2001** 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
16,757.9 
16,959.6 
17,708.6 
18,473.2 
19,748.6 
20,729.7 
22,022.8 
23,629.0 
1,673.0 
1,106.1 
1,038.9 
898.6 
1,412.4 
1,168.4 
1,463.2 
1,639.4 
9.98 
6.52 
5.87 
4.86 
7.15 
5.64 
6.64 
7.40 
* As of the end of each year. 
** The loan program was suspended in these three years. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Loans by year (N=1,263) 
Year Frequency Percent (%) 
1998 24 1.90 
1999 1 .08 
2002 656 51.94 
2003 92 7.28 
2004 85 6.73 
2005 147 11.64 
2006 258 20.43 
 
Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
19
Table 5: Loans by year 
Year Total loan 
amount (¥) 
Total amount of 
interest (¥) 
Increase rate 
(%) 
Number of social 
security accounts used 
1998 142,100 22,724.4 16 102 
2002 3,468,100 542,284.6 15.6 3,691 
2003 715,100 47,399.1 6.6 258 
2004 500,700 25,596.2 5.1 378 
2005 1,027,160 45,977.4 4.5 743 
2006 1,596,400 N/A N/A 1,306 
Total* 5,853,160 683,981.70 11.7 5,172 
* Not including 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Dual incentives and dual asset building 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rural social 
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Savings for old age 
Primary incentives: 
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Figure 2: Average loan amount per social security account by year 
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Figure 3: Loan start date by year                            Figure 4: Loan return date by year 
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